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The experience of the recent financial crisis leads to reflections on the relevant mechanisms of 
risk reduction of an investment firms activity. Within the European Union, the Directive 2010/76/
EU (CRD III) has introduced new rules regarding the remuneration policy for investment firms. The 
main goal was to reduce the risk of investment firms’ activity. This is a prudential regulation. The 
purpose of this article is to evaluate, from the point of view of an investment firm, proposed by the 
EU legislator approach to remuneration policy aimed at reducing the risk of the operation of this 
type of financial institutions. The aim was to identify the key problems with which Polish invest-
ment firms may face in the future in connection with new remuneration policy rules. As far as the 
methodology is concerned, the author carried out in-depth and standardized interviews with the 
representatives of several investment firms in Poland. In addition, the method of observation has 
been applied. The results of the research demonstrates that the abovementioned regulations will 
have limited impact on reducing the risk of the activities of these financial institutions as well as 
their implementation will be difficult for them in practice.
Introduction
One notable feature of a properly functioning capital 
market is the stability and safety of its participants. 
That can be ensured by introducing appropriate regu-
lations. Recently global financial markets have expe-
rienced a crisis during which it turned out that the 
regulations do not work properly in difficult circum-
stances (Hoshi, 2011; Miele & Sales 2011; Tropeano, 
2011). Therefore, there is time to consider the creation 
and implementation of solutions functioning properly 
regardless of the situation on the market. It should be 
noted that the risk profile of operating on the capital 
market investment firms depends on appropriate re-
muneration policy. According to that it is proposed 
to limit the approaches that encourage employees to 
make decisions leading to the increase of the invest-
ment firm’s risk. This is an element of limitation of 
freedom activity carried out by the investment firm in 
order to ensure properly functioning capital market.
The rules on remuneration policy for investment 
firms within the European Union were adopted in the 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
2010/76/EU of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital require-
ments for the trading book and for re-securitisations, 
and the supervisory review of remuneration policies 
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(Capital Requirements Directive III [CRD III]). It can 
be hypothesized that the above rules would have limit-
ed impact on reducing the risk of the activities of these 
financial institutions as well as their implementation 
will be a challenge for them. The purpose of this article 
is to evaluate from the point of view of investment firm 
the approach proposed by the EU legislature as regards 
the remuneration policy aimed at reducing the risk of 
this type of financial institutions. This problem has not 
been raised in Polish literature so far.
The author of the following paper conducted re-
search amongst the investment firms operating in Po-
land. The aim of the research was to identify the key 
problems  with  which  Polish  investment  firms  may 
face in the future in connection with new remunera-
tion policy rules. The author carried out in-depth and 
standardized  interviews  with  the  representatives  of 
several investment firms.
The ground of the problem
The financial sector problems over the world, leading 
not only to the failure of financial institutions, but also 
to systemic problems, tend to discuss the sources of 
occurring irregularities. One of the frequently report-
ed reason having a significant negative impact on the 
financial condition of investment firms, was improp-
erly functioning remuneration policy.  Th   e remunera-  Th   e remunera- The remunera-
tion systems have in a number of cases not been closely 
related to the strategy and risk appetite of the company 
and its longer term interests (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
According to the report The High-level Group on Fi-
nancial Supervision in the EU (2009) remuneration and 
incentive schemes within financial institutions contrib-
uted to excessive risk-taking by rewarding short-term 
expansion of the volume of (risky) trades rather than the 
long-term profitability of investments. Shortly after that 
the Financial Stability Board has adopted Principles for 
Sound Compensation Practices (2009), the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (now the European 
Banking Authority) has published High-level Principles 
for Remuneration Policies (2009). 
In  April  2009  the  European  Commission  issued 
Commission  Recommendation  on  Remuneration  Poli-
cies in the Financial Sector (2009). There has been high-
lighted that excessive risk-taking in the financial serv-
ices industry and in particular in investment firms has 
contributed to the failure of financial undertakings and 
to systemic problems in the Member States and globally. 
These problems have spread to the rest of the economy 
and led to high costs for society. Furthermore, there was 
noted, that remuneration practices in a large part of the 
financial services industry have been running counter 
to effective and sound risk management. These practices 
tended to reward short-term profit and gave staff incen-
tives to pursue unduly risky activities which provided 
higher income in the short term while exposing finan-
cial undertakings to higher potential losses in the longer 
term. There was also provided that, all risk management 
and control systems have limitations and, as the finan-
cial crisis has shown, can fail to deal with the risks cre-
ated by inappropriate incentives, due to the increasing 
complexity of the risks and the range of ways by which 
risk may be taken. Consequently, a simple functional 
separation between business units and staff responsible 
for risk management and control systems is necessary 
but no longer sufficient.
The discussion on the problem was continued. In 
2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
published Compensation Principles and Standards As-
sessment Methodology (2010), and then Consultation 
Report on the Range of Methodologies for Risk and Per-
formance Alignment of Remuneration (2010).
Bearing in mind the above, it must be concluded 
that the problem of investment firms’ remuneration 
is extremely important. Remuneration policies which 
give incentives to take risks that exceed the general 
level of risk tolerated by the institution can undermine 
sound and effective risk management and exacerbate 
excessive risk taking behaviour (Krasnik, 2011). The 
improper  remuneration  policy  may  have  significant 
impact  not  only  in  micro-scale  but  also  may  have 
systemic importance. As it is widely recognized, ex-
cessive growth of the risk of investment firm leads to 
the increase of the capital market and the financial 
market risk. This arises as the capital market and fi-
nancial market is a system of connected vessels, so the 
weakness of one’s investment firm may weaken the re-
maining players on the market (Markwat, Kole & Van 
Dijk, 2009; Aloui, Aissa & Nguyen, 2011; Guo, Chen 
& Huang, 2011).
The answer to the identified problem within the Euro-
pean Union was the adoption of the CRD III regulating 
remuneration issues applying both to investment firms 
and credit institutions. Such kind of regulations have 72 Sz. Okoń
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not existed in the UE legal system before. It is worth 
noting that these regulations do not apply to entities 
such as investment funds, pension funds, and private 
equity funds. It is a kind of package requirements, pru-
dential regulations, in order to prevent potential adverse 
effects of poorly designed remunerations structures for 
the accuracy of risk management and risk-taking con-
trol by individual employees. It obliges investment firms 
to establish and implement policy and remuneration 
practices contributing to effective risk management in 
respect of the particular categories of staff whose pro-
fessional activities have a significant impact on the risk 
profile of the investment firm.
Methodology
The author of the following paper conducted research 
amongst key investment firms operating in Poland. The 
author understands the investment firms as brokerage 
houses, banks conducting brokerage activities, foreign 
investment firms operating in Poland as well as legal 
entities with their seats in the member state of OECD 
or WTO conducting brokerage activities in Poland.
The author carried out in-depth and standardized 
interviews with the representatives of several invest-
ment firms. These interviews were specified in terms 
of content and conducted using a detailed plan with 
a list of questions.  In addition, the author used the 
method of observation, i.e. planned observations on 
investment firms to indicate dependencies that exist 
between occurring processes and phenomena as well 
as discrepancies or contradictions.
In the result of the research it was possible to iden-
tify the key problems with which Polish investment 
firms may face in the future in connection with new 
remuneration policy rules.
Remuneration policy
In the light of the conducted analysis by the remunera-
tion policy should be understood the policy including 
salaries and discretionary retirement benefits. This is 
broader approach because it also includes within its 
scope some kind of benefits payable to former employ-
ees who are retired. It is worth noting that according 
to the CRD III this policy applies to certain distinct 
groups  of  individuals  acting  within  the  investment 
firm, i.e. senior management, risk takers, staff engaged 
in control functions and any employee receiving total 
remuneration that takes them into the same remuner-
ation bracket as senior management and risk takers, 
whose professional activities have a material impact on 
their risk profile. It can be concluded that the above 
applies to a part of the wider remuneration system of 
a particular investment firm. Therefore, these institu-
tions face the challenge of adapting the existing remu-
neration schemes to the requirements of EU law. This 
will require taking a series of actions at the operational 
level, including changes in labour contracts with exist-
ing employees.
The  body  exercising  supervisory  functions  of  an 
investment firm is responsible for the adoption of the 
remuneration policy and its implementation. Further-
more, its functions include the review of remunera-
tion policy, which should be carried out at least once 
a year. It should rely on and verify that the solutions 
correspond to the remuneration policy assumptions, 
primarily determine whether it contributes to the pre-
vention of excessive risk-taking. The remuneration of 
persons engaged in the review should not depend in 
any way from the areas they control. If so, this would 
lead to a conflict of interest.
Subject to the provisions of CRD III, the investment 
firms identified as significant one as regards their size, 
structure or undertaken activities, should establish re-
muneration committee. It opinions the remuneration 
policy from the perspective of its impact on the risk 
profile  of  the  investment  firm.  Membership  on  this 
committee is restricted to persons who do not perform 
any executive functions in the investment firm. It is the 
reasonable solution. Otherwise, persons exercising ex-
ecutive functions would evaluate solutions as regards 
their own remuneration.
Remuneration and capital adequacy
The remuneration policy may have a significant impact 
on compliance of capital adequacy requirements by the 
investment firms. The investment firms are obliged to 
meet the capital adequacy requirements according to 
the following UE regulations: Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit  institutions,  Directive  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment and the Council 2006/49/EC of 14 June 2006  on 
the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit in-
stitutions, Directive of the European Parliament and the Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Council 2009/111/EC of 16 September 2009 amending 
Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as 
regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain 
own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrange-
ments, and crisis management as well as CRD III. It 
should also be noted that the package of CRD IV (UE 
directive and regulation) is planned.
The problem of capital adequacy of financial institu-
tions has been widely discussed in the literature, both 
in relation to credit institutions and investment firms 
(Blum, 1999; Blum & Hellwig, 1995; Thakor, 1996; Bar-
rios & Blanco, 2003; Calem & Rob, 1999). The payment 
of remuneration regarded as the particular cost for the 
investment  firm  may  cause  that  this  institution  will 
not be able to meet the basic capital adequacy require-
ments. Concerning the above, it is assumed that the 
total variable remuneration should not limit the ability 
of investment firms to strengthen their capital base. The 
implemented solutions should allow providing flexible 
remuneration  policy  relating  to  the  variable  compo-
nents of remuneration, including reducing the amount 
of these components or even non-payment (CRD III). 
The remuneration policy should therefore make appro-
priate balance between fixed and variable components. 
It should be flexible in this regards. Fixed remuneration 
should be high enough to allow freedom for remunera-
tion policy of variable components. By adopting this 
solution the primacy of capital adequacy requirements 
before the payment of variable remuneration is given. 
This approach certainly makes that employees having an 
impact on the risk profile of an investment firm would 
seek to ensure that the relevant capital adequacy require-
ments have been met. However, this may be controver-
sial, from the point of view of those employees who do 
not receive variable compensation, despite the fact that 
they did not have any impact on decision-making influ-
encing capital adequacy requirements.
Challenges for investment firms
Specific solutions as regards the remuneration policy 
require detailed analysis and evaluation in terms of 
whether they actually have an impact on reducing the 
risk of the investment firms. The most important issues 
concerning the remuneration policy may be system-
atized by highlighting the following areas:
1)  measurement of results and granting of remunera- measurement of results and granting of remunera-
tion;
2)  remuneration in the form of financial instruments;
3)  deferred payment of remuneration;
4)  severance pay;
5)  guaranteed variable remuneration;
6)  retirement benefits;
7)  hedging strategies and insurances.
Results measurement and granting of 
remuneration
According to the CRD III, the remuneration to be paid 
must be based on a kind of joined results, i.e. results 
of the individual employee, the individual for whom 
the employee works and the whole investment firm. 
This  approach  means  that  in  certain  situations,  the 
employee may suffer the consequences of poor perfor-
mance of other entities subject to assessment. Subject 
to the CRD III, in assessing, the financial criteria must 
be taken into account (quantitative) and non-financial 
(qualitative). In the opinion of the author, the first one 
appears to be objective, the employee has knowledge of 
the factors that affect the amount of his remuneration. 
As regards the second type of the problem the objec-
tiveness is limited. The criteria can be characterized 
by relatively high discretion and must be used very 
carefully. In line of the CRD III, evaluation of each 
employee should take place over a number of years. 
However, the problem appears in the case of newly 
hired employees who, in extreme cases will be able to 
bear the negative consequences of decisions made in 
the past when they were not employed in the current 
investment firm.
Remuneration in the form of financial 
instruments
One of the requirements imposed on investment firms 
is obligation to introduce remuneration in the form of 
financial instruments. Therefore, the CRD III expects 
that at least 50% of the variable remuneration shall 
consist of shares or corresponding to shares property 
titles subject to the legal structure of an investment 
firm or related instruments; optionally non-monetary 
instruments, in case of non-public investment firms. 
The aim of this solution is taking into account long-
term interests of the investment firm. This may be a 
mitigating element of conflict interest arising from the 
agency theory (Aseff & Santos, 2005). In the opinion 
of the author, it should be noted that there is no prob-74 Sz. Okoń
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.35 DOI:  CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 6 Issue1 70-77 2012
lem with the payment of remuneration in the form of 
equity rights in a public company, but the difficulties 
arise in other cases. First, the problem of valuation of 
the company should be identified. Second, the need to 
carry out operations with the corporate nature should 
be indicated, for example, the share capital increase of 
investment firm to offer equity rights as remuneration 
for individual employees. However, in this case the use 
of phantom shares in particular cases would be pos-
sible (Lynch & Perry, 2003; Lamber, Larcker & Weigelt, 
1993). Given the above, it can be concluded that in 
addition to the payment of remuneration equivalent, 
non-public investment firms will have to incur addi-
tional costs. Furthermore, it is worth noting also other 
additional risks. In the case of transfer of shares to 
employees, the ownership structure of investment firm 
will change by joining of minority shareholders. The 
various national systems of corporate law may grant 
them special rights what will enable them to take ac-
tions that may adversely affect the proper functioning 
of the investment firm.
It can be extremely difficult for investment firms to 
implement at the operational level the remuneration 
policy  taking  into  account  the  above  requirements. 
They will have to organize the implementation, not 
only in the financial scope by ensuring adequate li-
quidity, but also from corporate point of view, by the 
adoption of the ownership structure of the investment 
firm ensuring possibility of remuneration in kind.
Deferred payment of remuneration
In order to encourage avoiding actions having a nega-
tive impact on the risk profile of investment firms the 
obligation of deferred payment of remuneration has 
been introduced in the CRD III. The significant part, 
which is at least 40% of the variable components of re-
muneration, should be spread over a period of not less 
than three to five years, and properly adapted to the 
nature of the activity, the risks and the activity of the 
particular employee. It should be noted that in the case 
of the variable components of a remuneration amount-
ing to a particularly large amount, deferment of the 
payment shall be at least 60% of this amount. Deferral 
period starts from the date of payment of the first part 
of variable remuneration. However, the rights to such 
compensation cannot be granted more often than once 
a year. The reason of the deferred payment of remuner-
ation requirement is to reward employees only for the 
provision of specified results in a long-term perspec-
tive. According to the CRD III, the length of deferral 
period should be determined in accordance with the 
business cycle, the nature of the activities, risks expo-
sure as well as the activities of employees. It is worth 
noting that in the light of the above the specification 
of such term may be difficult or even impossible. Each 
of the periods mentioned above may be different. The 
requirement  to  defer  payment  of  remuneration  in 
comparison with the obligation to pay no less that 50% 
of remuneration in the form of financial instruments 
causes that in deferral period in each year the part of 
the remuneration is paid in cash and part in the form 
of financial instruments. This approach may have an 
impact on reducing the risk of the investment firm due 
to the fact that employees in making their decisions 
will seek to take into account long-term interests of the 
financial institution.
Severance pay
In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  remuneration, 
which are aimed at reducing the investment firm’s risk, 
the severance pay caused by termination of the con-
tract should reflect the results achieved by the particu-
lar employee over time. The rules for such payments 
shall be determined in the way that does not reward 
failure (CRD III). In this case, the above refers primari-
ly to limit the introduction of solutions encouraging to 
take actions leading to a higher risk than preferred by 
the owners of investment firm. This negative effect can 
occur in case of implementation of golden parachutes 
(Evans & Hefner, 2009; Singh & Harianto, 1989; Choi, 
2004) causing that employees after leaving the institu-
tion receive above-average remuneration regardless of 
the results already obtained and the level of risk of the 
investment firm.
Guaranteed variable remuneration
To encourage jobseekers to employment in particular 
investment  firm  by  variable  remuneration  (what  in 
view of new remuneration rules may be limited), the 
guaranteed payment of variable remuneration has been 
introduced. The above is exceptional and occurs only 
in the recruitment of new staff and is limited only to 
the first year of employment. There is no specification 
as regards the payment method of such remuneration. Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
75 New Approach to Remuneration Policy for Investment Firms: a Polish Capital Market Perspective
However, it can be assumed that it may have the form of 
both cash and financial instruments. According to the 
CRD III, in the next years guaranteed payment of vari-
able remuneration is unacceptable. This solution may 
be a field for abuse for investment firms. They could 
potentially be used for short periods of employment in 
order to circumvent the stringent requirements. In this 
case, the variable remuneration may have no effect on 
reducing the risk of investment firms.
Retirement benefits
The  new  rules  also  introduce  a  special  approach  to 
retirement  benefits.  It  is  assumed  that  remuneration 
policy  should  take  into  account  the  investment  firm 
strategy, its goals, values   and long-term interests. If an 
employee leaves the investment firm before reaching 
retirement age, the investment firm should retain un-
specified retirement benefits for a period of five years in 
the form of specific financial instruments. However, in 
the case when an employee has reached retirement age, 
an employee is obliged to keep unspecified pension ben-
efits paid in the form of financial instruments within five 
years (CRD III). In the opinion of the author, this solu-
tion seems to be controversial, particularly in the second 
of these cases. Retirement benefits will be granted, but 
disposal shall be limited within defined period.
Hedging strategies and insurances
Pursuant to the regulations of the CRD III, staff mem-
bers  are  required  to  undertake  not  to  use  personal 
hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-relat-
ed insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects 
embedded in their remuneration arrangements. Tak-
ing into account the issue of remuneration payment 
in the form of financial instruments, it seems that a 
relatively easy solution for employees would be adopt-
ing hedging strategies or insurances. In this way they 
could  protect  themselves  against  the  uncertainty  as 
to the value of financial instruments in the future. In 
this way, the remuneration rules would not have fur-
ther sense, because employees still could take actions 
that may affect the risk profile of the investment firm 
without negative consequences for them. Therefore it 
would be indifferent whether the decisions take into 
account the long-term interests of the investment firm. 
According to that the application of this solution by 
employees is excluded.
The results of the research
The research has been carried out in several invest-
ment firms operating within the Polish capital market. 
The author used the method of in-depth and standard-
ized interviews. During the conducted research it has 
been  demonstrated  that  above  remuneration  rules 
would have limited impact on reducing the risk of the 
investment firms as well as their implementation will 
be a huge challenge for them. The representatives of 
the investment firms indicated mainly the following 
problems:
1)  most of the remuneration rules cannot be imple-
mented properly in investment firms as there are 
many operation obstacles;
2)  the rules does not take into account the charac-
teristics of the Polish capital market, especially the 
stage of its development; it should be noted that 
there is a huge difference between the nature of UK 
and Polish investment firms but the rules within 
the European Union are uniformed;
3)  the adoption of new rules will have limited influ-
ence on the risk level of investment firms;
4)  the  implementation  process  would  generate  ad-
ditional costs for investment firms what may limit 
development of Polish capital market;
5)  the same remuneration rules apply for investment 
firms as well as credit institutions and does not take 
into account that operation of these financial insti-
tutions is quite different;
6)  some of the obligations are contrary to the exist-
ing regulations, especially arising from corporate, 
labour and personal data protection law.
Conclusions
European  Union  Member  States  were  required  to 
implement the provisions of the CRD III into national 
legislation by 1 January 2011. It should be highlighted 
that national law may differ slightly from each other in 
this regard, but it is worth noting that the provisions 
of the CRD III are relatively detailed, giving limited 
freedom for implementation. For investment firms this 
means the time of changes and challenge as regards 
new regulations. Bearing in mind the above analysis, 
it must be concluded that investment firms will face in 
practice many problems.
It seems that, the introduction of stringent remu-
neration rules, causing in the opinion of investment 76 Sz. Okoń
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firms,  many  limitations  and  uncertainties  regarding 
payments, may result in a permanent increase of fixed 
remuneration. Therefore the expectations of employ-
ees in this field will probably change. In the opinion 
of the author, offering higher fixed remuneration by 
investment firms meeting expectations of employees 
means that these employees will approach with indif-
ference to variable remuneration and thus it will not be 
treated as the incentive to limit decisions affecting the 
growth of the risk of the investment firms. The basic 
goal of the new remuneration rules will not be prob-
ably achieved in this case. 
As far as the remuneration policy is concerned, in 
the opinion of the author, the EU legislature has made 
too deep harmonization. It is worth noting that, de-
spite the distinctions of the common EU capital mar-
ket, there are also the capital markets of each Member 
States and operating within these markets investment 
firms. Each capital market has its specific character-
istics, especially in the meaning of its structure, and 
participants. Moreover, each capital market is in par-
ticular stage of development, what can be observed for 
example it the size and volume of transactions. The 
profile of risk of investment firms on mature markets 
and emerging markets may differ. Therefore, solutions 
imposing uniform remuneration rules for investment 
firms aimed at reducing their risk may lead to limita-
tion of activity of those financial institutions that oper-
ate on markets which are in development stage.
In the opinion of the author, it is worth noting that 
the  new  remuneration  policy  rules  imposed  by  the 
CRD III could substantially affect the reduction of ac-
tivity of local investments firms operating on emerg-
ing markets. These financial institutions often have to 
compete  with  large  financial  conglomerates  operat-
ing across borders. It is much more difficult for local 
investment  firms  operating  on  the  emerging  capital 
markets to achieve a relatively high level of revenue. It 
should be taken into account that new regulations may 
have impact on the increase of costs. Firstly, because 
of the need to reorganize the existing remuneration 
schemes,  what  is  associated  with  additional  efforts, 
commitment  of  employees  responsible  for  this  area 
of  investment  firms,  as  well  as  outside  consultants. 
Secondly, as indicated earlier, it appears that the ex-
pectations of employees will change and they will be 
interested in the increase of fixed rather that uncertain 
and deferred variable part of remuneration. Although, 
the cost of adapting may by partially passed on the end 
user (client), this solution seems to be limited. This 
would probably have negative effects on the dynamic 
of development of these financial institutions.
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